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RESUMEN  
Muchos de los elementos clave que resultaron en el Acuerdo de Copenhague han 
evolucionado en los últimos seis años. Una mayor evidencia científica, un mayor 
desarrollo en el análisis económico relativo a las consecuencias del cambio 
climático, los avances tecnológicos, el desarrollo del sector energético renovable y 
las transformaciones en la gobernanza climática han posibilitado la adopción del 
Acuerdo de Paris. El presente artículo analiza algunos de estos factores, los 
resultados de la COP21 y los retos pendientes. El artículo concluye que el éxito 
diplomático que culminó en el Acuerdo de París dota al mundo de un nuevo marco 
global en la gobernanza climática que contiene elementos valiosos en la lucha 
contra el cambio climático. Sin embargo, los compromisos climáticos actuales 
llevarán a sobrepasar en aproximadamente un grado el objetivo de limitar el 
aumento medio de la temperatura global a 2ºC. Es necesario aumentar el grado de 
ambición. Nuestros esfuerzos de implementación tienen que comenzar sin dilación si 
hemos de evitar las peores consecuencias del cambio climático. La tarea pendiente 
es hercúlea ya que resolver el problema climático requiere la profunda 
transformación de los sistemas productivos y de consumo.    
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Cambio climático, COP21, INDCs y descarbonización 
 
ABSTRACT 
Many key elements that led to the Copenhagen Accord have evolved in the past six 
years. Increased scientific evidence, updated economic analysis on the 
consequences of climate change, technological advances, developments in the 
renewable energy sector and transformations in climate governance have created a 
narrow window of opportunity through which the Paris Agreement emerged. Some of 
																																																								
1 Note to the editor. The current article is an updated version of ‘COP21 and the Paris Agreement: a diplomacy 
masterclass in search of greater ambition’ published by Elcano Royal Institute.  
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these key changes, the results of COP21 and the challenges ahead are critically 
analysed. The analysis concludes that the diplomatic success that culminated in the 
adoption of the Paris Agreement provides the world with a new global climate 
governance framework that contains valuable elements in the fight against climate 
change. However, current mitigation commitments will overshoot the 2ºC limit by 
around one degree. Therefore more needs to be done and work has to start in 
earnest now if we are to avoid the worst consequences of a changing climate. The 
task at hand is herculean as solving the climate problem requires profoundly 
transforming productive systems and consumption patterns. 
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1. FROM COPENHAGEN TO PARIS 
 
1.1. Science, economics, law and energy  
 
The road from Copenhagen to Paris has been paved by developments in science, 
economics, law, energy and climate governance. The science is more robust in 2015 
than it was in 2009. In fact, the publication of the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2013-2014 stated that 
climate change is unequivocal, it is already impacting socioeconomic and natural 
systems alike, and human influence on this process is clear (IPCC, 2014). There is 
an overwhelming agreement among scientists (97% agree) that climate change is 
happening and that its anthropogenic component is significant. The scientific debate 
regarding the existence of climate change and its anthropogenic origin has finally 
been laid to rest2.  
 
Climate change economists agree that climate models underestimate the 
consequences of climate change. They also agree that action in earnest is called for 
(Stern, 2007) as climate change is already affecting our economies, or will do so in 
the medium and long-term (Howard and Sylvan, 2015). In fact, analysis by Dell et al. 
(2011) on less developed countries, as well as Burke et al. (2015), confirm the 
relationship between economic growth and temperature increases. The latter 
conclude that economic productivity reaches its peak at an average temperature of 
13ºC with sharp declines in productivity at higher average temperatures. By the end 
of the century global GDP per capita could be 23% lower in high greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emission scenarios compared to those where there is no climate change 
(Burke et al., 2015), a powerful reason to limit our emissions. Limitation in economic 
modelling and forecasting (Aghion et al. 2014; Stern, 2013; Zenghelis, 2016, pers. 
Comm.;) should however caution against relying on any particular figure.  
 
In a recently conducted survey by the World Economic Forum among 750 of its 
members, extreme weather events, natural catastrophes and failure to mitigate and 
adapt to climate change were ranked among the most likely global risks, with failure 
to take climate action also being the global risk with highest impact within the next 10 
years (WEF, 2016). It is hence not surprising that mainstreaming climate risk analysis 
in investment portfolios is beginning to occur. According to BlackRock (2015) asset 
owners are starting to worry about stranded assets and companies that are most 
vulnerable to physical or regulatory climate risks could trade at a discount in the 
future. The inclusion of climate risk analysis in investment portfolios is expected to 
negatively impact high cost oil companies and oil exporting countries while positively 
impacting parts of the renewable energy industry, companies in the energy efficiency 
business and the clean technology sector. The arguments for divesting are mounting.   
 
Beyond the concern about stranded assets, the impact of climate change on asset 
value is beginning to concern financial regulators and investors. Recent work by 
Dietz et al. (2016) on climate value at risk (VaR) analyses the loss of asset value due 
to the destruction, or acceleration in the depreciation, of capital assets and from the 
																																																								
2  The political understanding and agreement regarding this matter is however asymmetric with still some 
politicians in the US for instance questioning the science behind climate change and blocking decisive action on 
this issue (Bodansky and Day O’Connor, forthcoming).   
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reduction in output as a result of climate change. The authors of the study argue that 
to the extent that financial assets are backed by economic activities, reductions in 
growth can lead to losses in the value of financial assets. Assuming a value of global 
non-bank financial assets of US$ 143.3 trillion in 2013, the study finds that the mean 
climate value at risk (climate VaR) is 1.8% or US$ 2.5 trillion under a 2.5ºC warming 
scenario to 2100 (the 99th percentile however would entail a climate VaR of 16.9% or 
US$24.2 trillion). Under a 2ºC warming scenario the mean climate VaR is 1.2% or 
US$1.7 trillion (the 99th percentile would however imply a climate VaR of 9.2% or 
US$13.3 trillion). The present value of financial assets is set to be larger under a 2ºC 
warmer scenario and hence risk neutral and risk averse investors should call for 
mitigation according to the authors. 
 
In addition to the concerns regarding stranded assets and the climate VaR, lawyers 
are exploring the possibility of future law suits against fund and pension managers 
that fail to take into account material risks such as climate change that could reduce 
the value of investments by 5% or more (Covington, Thorton and Hepburn, 2016).  
 
The cost of renewable energy has dropped dramatically since Copenhagen. Costs 
for solar photovoltaic modules fell by 65%-70% between 2009 and 2013, photovoltaic 
(PV) prices have dropped 80% since 2008 and onshore wind electricity costs have 
dropped by 18% (IRENA, 2014). In the coming years the cost of renewable energy is 
expected to be further reduced and solar photovoltaic is expected to reach grid parity 
in 80% of countries in the next two years (University of Cambridge and PwC, 2015). 
Given that energy represents a significant share (35%) of global emissions (IPCC, 
2014), any cost reduction in low carbon energy sources is good news for the energy 
transition.  
 
1.2. Climate change governance ahead of COP21: from the French 
Presidency to the Pope 
 
The French Presidency of COP21 worked throughout 2015 to prepare the climate 
conference in Paris. The COP President, Laurent Fabius, as well as his team, were 
praised throughout the meeting for their ability to listen, ensure transparency (The 
Climate Group, 2015) and broker consensus on the main sticking points in the 
negotiating texts. One of the innovative moves by the French was to invite Heads of 
State and Government to intervene at the beginning rather than at the end of the 
COP, as was the case in Copenhagen. This early engagement showcased political 
will and arguably helped push technical work forward from the outset.  
 
In stark contrast to COP15, expectations as regards the outcome of the Paris 
Conference were lower than expectations regarding the outcome of the Copenhagen 
Conference. French diplomacy, think tanks and academics alike had warned the 
world that COP21 results would not solve the climate change problem. Paris was not 
thought of as the COP to end all COPs, as was perhaps Copenhagen for some 
outside observers. The fact that an agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol was not 
reached during COP15 and the realisation that solving the climate problem means 
totally transforming productive systems and consumption patterns were powerful 
reasons to purposefully lower expectations as regards the Paris outcome.  
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Following a bottom-up approach to raising ambition, all countries, developed and 
developing, were asked in December 2013 to submit their Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (INDCs)3 well in advance of COP21, according to their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) in 
the light of national circumstances. This is a substantial change from the Kyoto 
Protocol that was based on developed countries4 being the only ones with emission 
reduction targets. There has hence been a transition from blame to collective will to 
act according to national possibilities and priorities. The result was that by the 1st of 
October 2015 some 119 INDCs from 147 Parties, amounting to 86% of global 
emissions in 2010, had been submitted, a first in the history of climate negotiations 
(UNFCCC, 2015a)5. These figures are indeed impressive as they include almost all 
Parties and all major GHG emitters.  
 
Key emitters were on board. China and the US had jointly announced in November 
2014 their intention to work together to ensure the adoption of an agreement in Paris. 
In its INDC the US announced it would reduce its emission in 2025 by 26% - 28% 
below its 2005 level, emphasising that the target is in line with an 80% reduction of 
GHG emissions by 20506.  
 
China’s INDC claimed its intention to both reach its emissions peak and increase the 
share of non-fossil fuel energy sources in its energy mix to 20% by 2030. In addition, 
China’s CO2 intensity per unit of GDP is to be reduced by 60% - 65% compared to 
2005 levels. China also committed to increase forest stock volume by 4.5 billion cubic 
meters compared to 2005 levels7. 
 
Europe’s contribution was announced ahead of those of the US and China at the 
European Council in October 2014. The European INDC included an economy-wide 
GHG reduction target of no less than 40% by 2030 compared to 1990. This target is 
to be jointly fulfilled, with no use of international market-based mechanisms. 
Allocation of the targets among member countries is yet to be finalised.   
 
However, the commitments described above, contained in the US, China and 
European INDCs, are rated as ‘medium’ according to Climate Action Tracker8. This 
means that if all governments’ efforts were in this range, global average warming 
would likely exceed 2ºC. This is also the case of other major emitters such as Brazil 
and India. INDCs submitted by Japan, Russia or South Africa, among others, are 
rated as insufficient, meaning that if all governments put made similar efforts to those 
of these countries, global average warming would likely be in the range of 3ºC to 4ºC. 
Only Bhutan, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Gambia and Morocco (the latter being the future 
COP22 presidency) have submitted intended contributions in line with the goal of 
limiting mean global temperature increases to 2ºC.  
																																																								
3 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) are countries post 2020 climate commitments. 
4 Developed countries have historically emitted more GHG (Friedrich and Damassa, 2014). 
5 The submission of INDCs continued throughout the COP and in the months that followed.  
6 http://ow.ly/uV7n3001dr9  
7 http://ow.ly/N2983001dsx Additionally, the joint statement by China and the US in September 2015 confirmed 
China’s intention of launching a nation-wide emissions trading scheme by 2017 that would cover the power 
sector as well as the main industrial sectors. A ‘green dispatch’ will also be implemented to promote low-carbon 
energy sources in the electricity mix.  
8 http://climateactiontracker.org/indcs.html  
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Therefore, neither INDCs submitted before or during COP21 are enough to provide 
the world with a reasonable probability of limiting the average global temperatures to 
2ºC above pre-industrial levels. In fact, the median increase in global average 
temperatures is likely to be 2.7ºC in 2100 compared to pre-industrial levels, provided 
all pledges included in the INDCs are fully implemented (Climate Action Tracker, 
2015a, b). This reality check reinforces the need for continued negotiations and 
increased ambition over time.   
 
In addition to national commitments unprecedented action at subnational, city and 
firm level is occurring. The traditional top-down approach to climate regime building is 
being progressively transformed. Initiatives from business, cities, regions and civil 
society have been channelled, inter alia, through the Lima-Paris Action Agenda 
(LPAA). The LPAA resulted in approximately 11,000 concrete actions, engagement 
by over 2,000 cities, more than 2,000 companies9 (with a market value equivalent to 
the GDP of China, France and Germany combined) as well as more than 200 civil 
society organisations. 
 
Finally, in 2009 the Interfaith Declaration on Climate Change (García Acuña, 2010) 
was presented during COP15 to Yvo de Boer10. In the document many of the world’s 
religious faiths called for decisive action to fight climate change and stated that 
‘climate change is not merely an economic or technical problem, but rather at its core 
is a moral, spiritual and cultural one’11 . Six years later, the publishing of Pope 
Francis’ Encyclical Letter ‘Laudato Si’ on the care of our common home has made 
headline news and has contributed to the outcome in Paris. In that Letter Pope 
Francis calls for ‘substituting fossil fuels and developing sources of renewable 
energy’ (Bergoglio, 2015: 21).   
 
2. THE PARIS AGREEMENT. MAIN ELEMENTS AND PRELIMINARY 
ASSESSMENT 
 
After over 20 years of climate negotiations the Paris Agreement adopted in 2015 
could be remembered for providing humanity with the framework for decisive climate 
action, if current INDCs are fully implemented and ambition is regularly ramped-up. In 
order for increased ambition to materialise an orderly and asymmetric transition to a 
low carbon economy is needed. A monumental task considering that this 
transmutation would have to occur in almost 200 countries at various stages of 
development and facing a wide variety of socio-economic and political situations. The 
joy of diplomatic success must not lead to complacency. We have to act now and 
continue to do so until low carbon economies become the norm. Success will be 
measured against the 2ºC (1.5ºC) benchmark and that will require nothing short of a 
post-industrial green revolution. The key elements in the Paris Agreement are 
summarised in table 1 below:  
 
 
 
																																																								
9http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa/lpaa/massive-mobilization-by-non-state-stakeholders-summarized-at-cop21/  
10 Yvo de Boer was the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC from 2006 to 2010.  
11 http://www.interfaithdeclaration.org/download/idcc_english.pdf  
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Table 1. Some key elements of the Paris Agreement 
Area Status / Goal Comment 
Nature of the 
Paris 
Agreement 
Legally binding international 
agreement under the Vienna 
Convention. 
No legally binding targets are included, as this 
would have prevented the US from adopting the 
agreement. All countries are however obliged to 
have INDCs but there are no sanctions for failing 
to meet goals.  
Differentiation 
Parties will act according to 
their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective 
capabilities (CBDR-RC), in the 
light of different national 
circumstances.  
The CBDR-RC principle was enshrined in the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) to account for historical 
responsibility and asymmetric capacity to act.  
Developed countries should continue taking the 
lead via economy-wide absolute emission 
reduction commitments.  
Mitigation & 
ambition 
Limit temperature increases to 
well below 2ºC, aspiring to 
1.5ºC. 
The 1.5ºC goal has been a historic demand by 
Small Island Developing States, among others, 
that are threatened by sea-level rise.   
Emissions will peak as soon as 
possible and decline thereafter 
Developing country emissions will take longer to 
reach their peak in emissions.  
Balance between GHG 
emissions and removals by 
sinks should occur in the 
second half of the century. This 
is a legally binding element of 
the agreement.  
A quantified emission reduction target by 2050 
failed to make it into the agreement.  
The decision on balance of emissions opens the 
door to the use of Carbon Capture and Storage 
(CCS) but technical, environmental and economic 
issues are still to be resolved.  
Parties will submit their 
nationally determined 
contribution every five years 
Ambition has to increase in each INDC 
submission. Ratcheting up of ambition can occur 
at any time.  
Submissions should be made 9 to 12 months in 
advance of the next COP to allow for adequate 
analysis of contributions.  
Parties should enhance sinks, 
including forests.  
The inclusion of article 5 on forests in the 
agreement has been a welcomed development as 
almost a fourth of global emissions come from 
agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) 
Progress 
A global stocktake will take 
place every five years, starting 
in 2023.  
A facilitative dialogue will occur 
in 2018 to analyse progress 
towards the long-term goal.  
The global stocktaking will help Parties ‘update 
and enhance’ (i.e. ratchet up) their INDCs.  
Finance 
US$100 billion per annum from 
2020 to 2025. A new goal will 
be set prior to 2025, with a 
floor of US$ 100 billion. 
Developed countries must provide finance. 
Developing countries can provide finance.  
Less developed countries demanded intermediate 
finance goals that were not included in the final 
version of the Paris Agreement.  
Work on different modalities for accounting for 
financial resources will be presented at COP24 in 
2018. 
ITMOs 
Cooperation among countries 
is fostered by the creation of 
Internationally Transferred 
Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs). 
The ITMOs are voluntary instruments that have to 
be authorised by Parties. Double counting is to be 
avoided and a net mitigation impact is to be 
pursued.  
Adaptation 
Future work entails developing 
methods to recognise 
adaptation efforts by 
developing countries.  
Significant advances in this area were achieved 
after the first week of negotiations. The Green 
Climate Fund will disburse funds for developing 
countries and least developed countries to 
produce their adaptation plans. 
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Loss and 
damage 
The work of the Warsaw 
International Mechanism on 
Loss and Damage will 
continue. 
No liability can be claimed. Developed countries 
can assist developing countries by providing 
technical assistance, among others.  
Transparency Establishes a Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency.  
Parties will be subject to a common transparency 
framework, although agreeing on third party 
oversight (a US demand) was opposed by India 
and China.  
Capacity 
building 
The Paris Committee on 
Capacity-building was 
established with a work plan 
for 2016-2020. 
Significant advances in this area were achieved 
after the first week of negotiations. 
Technology 
development 
and transfer 
A technology framework will 
analyse technology needs, 
implementation and action 
plans, inter alia. The goal is to 
accelerate innovation. 
Significant advances in this area were achieved 
after the first week of negotiations. Financial 
support will be provided for developing countries, 
especially for technologies in early stages of 
development.  
Sources: Draft decision -/CP.21. The Paris Agreement; Day et al. (2015) and Ulargui (pers. comm).  
 
2.1. A preliminary assessment of the Paris Agreement 
 
At the time of writing 162 INDCs corresponding to 189 Parties, which account for 
over 98% of global emissions, have been submitted 12 . This almost universal 
participation has led some institutions to state that the Paris Agreement has been a 
success. Furthermore, 175 Parties signed the Paris Agreement at the UN 
Headquarters in New York on April the 22nd, breaking the record number of 
signatures on the first day for any multilateral agreement. The agreement was also 
ratified by fifteen Parties, mainly Small Island Developing States (UNFCCC, 2016)13. 
This almost universal effort is a sign of the political capital invested in the success of 
COP21. The political momentum, aided by the driving forces that enabled the 
adoption of the Paris Agreement, seems strong.   
 
The above goals and efforts could provide the framework for an ‘ambition spiral’ to be 
unleashed. The references to 2ºC (and 1.5ºC) plus the goal of net zero emissions by 
the second half of the century provide us with a collective way forward as it anchors 
expectations for governments and businesses alike on the direction of travel towards 
decarbonisation. The hybrid architecture of the agreement, with national 
commitments (that are development compatible) but with an international 
transparency and accountability framework, have been enshrined into a durable 
agreement with periodic reviews that are set to increase ambition over time.  
 
Despite the positive elements detailed above, the agreement opted for universal 
participation and hence, understandably, fell short of the required ambition level. 
During the negotiation process various issues of paramount importance were left out 
of the agreement. These include: a CO2 price, a quantified emission reduction target 
																																																								
12 http://cait.wri.org/indc/  
13  The countries that ratified the Paris Agreement on April 22nd were: Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, 
Somalia, State of Palestine, Barbados,  Belize, Fiji, Grenada, Saint Kitts & Nevis, Samoa, Tuvalu,  Maldives, 
Saint Lucia, and Mauritius. See: http://newsroom.unfccc.int/paris-agreement/closing-paris-agreement-signing-
press-release/. Note that the Paris Agreement will not enter into force until 55 Parties or more that represent at 
least 55% of global emissions have ‘deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession’ (UNFCCC, 2015b: 31) to the Paris Agreement.   
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by 2050, sectorial references regarding energy, the built environment and the role of 
cities. The international transport sector and bunkers (aviation and shipping), whose 
emissions could represent 40% by the middle of the century (European Parliament, 
2015), have been left out. There are furthermore other issues that have not been 
adequately specified in the Paris Agreement such as the sources of climate finance, 
accounting guidelines, how climate finance would be allocated and managed. Finally, 
despite the fact that the term ‘climate justice’ is mentioned in the Paris Agreement 
some authors have argued that equity has been effectively side-lined. This is due to 
the fact that historical responsibility is not tackled and developing countries are 
required to present their INDCs and to engage in increasingly ambitious climate 
action (Clemençon, 2016).  
 
3. THE CHALLENGES AHEAD: THE CLIMATE TROIKA.  
 
The discussion as regards ambition in the past few years has focused on INDCs. 
Looking ahead, implementing their commitments and ramping up ambition, subject to 
the availability of adequate finance, technology and skills, are a must if we are to 
avert the worst consequences of climate change.  
 
The climate troika (implementation, increased ambition and means) are analysed by 
Averchenkova and Bassi (2016) as the pillars of future climate action. The authors 
argue that given the lack of penalties in the Paris Agreement, in contrast with the 
Kyoto Protocol, and given the insufficient ambition in current commitments (UNEP, 
2015; Boyd et al, 2015; Climate Action Tracker, 2015) the credibility14 regarding the 
implementation of current climate commitments could be expected to help build trust 
amongst Parties, encourage transparent reporting and attract investment. Achieving 
success in the early implementation of INDCs could in turn increase the countries 
willingness to increase future ambition, setting in motion a virtuous circle of climate 
action. In their analysis, Averchenkova and Bassi conclude that improvements in 
terms of credibility for G20 countries could be achieved, inter alia, by increasing 
transparency, fostering inclusive and effective decision-making processes and 
avoiding policy reversals.  
 
Moving forward both developed and developing countries are faced with the task of 
transforming their socioeconomic systems, their energy and land use sectors in order 
to limit the worst consequences of climate change. Table 2 below provides a 
summary of the key elements that can help implement NDCs15.  
 
Table 2. Drivers of NDC implementation 
Driver Comment 
Framework 
legislation  
Examples include, inter alia, the UK’s Climate Change Act (2008) or the French 
Energy Transition for Green Growth law (2015) 
Economic 
instruments and 
valuation 
Carbon pricing through taxes or emission trading systems (that can achieve 
static and dynamic efficiency) should be implemented.  
Country-wide and sectorial cost-benefit analysis of climate action and inaction 
should be promoted and their results integrated in policy assessments.  
  
																																																								
14 Credibility according to Averchenkova and Bassi (2016) can be defined as the likelihood of implementation of 
climate pledges.  
15 INDCs are to be converted into Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).  
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Operationalization 
and prioritisation  
NDCs have to be translated into concrete plans and actions for the different 
economic sectors.  
Environmental 
Policy Integration 
Climate awareness should be raised across ministries, especially economics 
and finance ministries. Instruments such as green budgeting should be 
encouraged. The ultimate goal is to elaborate low emission development 
strategies (LEDS). 
Institutional 
framework & 
attribution 
Independent consultative bodies should be available and climate leaders 
identified. Responsibilities as regards climate policies should be clearly 
assigned among institutions.  
An appropriate governance framework inclusive of national and sub-national 
governments, cities, business and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) should 
be available.  
Appropriation National stakeholders should be involved in the co-creation of NDCs while 
ensuring transparency and avoiding double counting. Political buy-in should be 
secured in the long run. Better communication on climate change issues should 
be pursued. Messages should portray the proximate and known consequences 
of climate change as these could increase citizen awareness and will to act.  
Resources and 
knowledge 
The key needs in terms of resources and information include: stable and 
predictable finance, access to clean technologies, capacity building, monitoring, 
reporting and verification (MRV) knowledge and capabilities, information on 
transparency, clarity regarding compliance rules and procedures.  
Sources: Averchenkova and Bassi (2016); Comstock (2016); Escribano and Lázaro (2016) 
 
As a necessary companion to implementation, rules, modalities, guidelines and 
procedures have to be established (UNDP, 2016). This work will start in Bonn by mid 
May 2016. Further developments are needed as regards the Internationally Traded 
Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs), the new Sustainable Development Mechanism 
(SDM)16, the transparency framework, global stocktake and ratcheting up process 
(Bodansky and O’Connor, forthcoming). Parties should on the other hand start 
preparing for the implementation of the NDCs even before the entire set of rules and 
modalities are fully fleshed out by the UNFCCC. They should also start working on 
their low emission development strategies and they should continue supporting less 
developed countries through finance, technology transfers and capacity building. The 
road ahead looks significantly more complex and winding than the road already 
travelled.  
 
Concerning ambition a significant increase in mitigation commitments by the main 
emitters is needed (Bailey and Tomlinson, 2016). In order to limit global mean 
temperature increases to below 2ºC a recent MIT study reiterates the known figures 
of the need to reduce GHG emissions by developed countries by 80% by mid century 
compared to 2005. Developing countries’ emissions should peak ahead of 2030 and 
reduce emissions in absolute terms thereafter. More specifically, this would mean 
that the EU reduces its emission by 47% below 1990 levels by 2030, the US and 
other developed countries reduce their emissions by 45% below 2005 levels by 2030 
and China’s emissions peak by 2025, with other developing country emissions 
peaking shortly after (Sterman et al., 2015). The EU’s recent communication on the 
Paris Agreement (EC, 2016) and the US political context do not seem encouraging in 
this respect. China’s changing economic structure (that is moving away from carbon 
intensive sectors) could imply it is among the few large emitters to comply with the 
																																																								
16 The SDM would encompass offsets from both developed and developing countries (as the Clean Development 
Mechanism- CDM- and the Joint Implementation –JI- did under the Kyoto Protocol) at a project, program and 
policy level. 
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early peaking of GHG emissions needed to limit global mean temperature increases 
to 2ºC (Green and Stern, 2016). If the EU and the US want to lead by example their 
ambition has to be increased soon.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Many things have changed since Copenhagen. Developments in science, energy, 
economics, law and governance have made Paris possible. The Paris Agreement 
could hence be seen as a lagged reflection of a transformation that has been in the 
make for some time. The Paris Agreement has to be commended however for 
catalysing action and anchoring expectations. Progress to date is insufficient but the 
direction of travel towards a low carbon future is clear.  
 
The Paris Agreement has salvaged, for the time being, the multilateral climate 
process. The common narrative to pursue energy efficiency, energy security, 
development goals and more broadly sustainable development may have pushed 
climate commitments somewhat beyond the lowest common denominator. There is 
currently a broad approach to INDCs, which include commitments beyond GHG 
emission reductions, such as adaptation. There has also been a gradual blurring of 
the divide between developed and developing countries (Hermwille et al., 2015), by 
way of including all countries in the INDC scheme. Broadening of the INDC scope 
plus blurring of past country divisions may have facilitated, inter alia, the Paris 
Agreement. 
 
A successful climate agreement in which there is broad participation, honouring of 
pledges and significant behavioural change by big emitters is what we should aspire 
to. This will mean institutionalising a new low carbon development paradigm 
(Bodansky and O’Connor, 2016). Some elements of this winning formula are in the 
Paris Agreement. Almost 200 countries adopted the Paris Agreement and current 
INDCs account for over 98% of world emissions. Paris brings a dynamic agreement 
that seeks to limit temperatures to well below 2ºC, demands net-zero emissions this 
century, ensures a transparency mechanism applicable to all and requires increased 
ambition, while accounting for differentiation and being supported by climate finance.  
 
Missing elements in the agreement include a CO2 price, references to bunkers, 
greater specification as regards finance and implementation of the agreement. 
Current commitments, if fully implemented, will imply overshooting the 2ºC goal by 
about one degree. This fact alone should motivate prompt, decisive and continued 
climate action by all stakeholders. The stakes could not be higher.   
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